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How can Neuroscience contribute to Moral Philosophy, Psychology and Education based on Aristotelian 
Virtue Ethics?1 
Hyemin Han 
Stanford University 
Abstract 
The present essay discusses the relationship between moral philosophy, psychology and education based on virtue 
ethics, contemporary neuroscience, and how neuroscientific methods can contribute to studies of moral virtue and 
character. First, the present essay considers whether the mechanism of moral motivation and developmental model 
of virtue and character are well supported by neuroscientific evidence. Particularly, it examines whether the 
evidence provided by neuroscientific studies can support the core argument of virtue ethics, that is, motivational 
externalism. Second, it discusses how experimental methods of neuroscience can be applied to studies in human 
morality. Particularly, the present essay examines how functional and structural neuroimaging methods can 
contribute to the development of the fields by reviewing the findings of recent social and developmental 
neuroimaging experiments. Meanwhile, the present essay also considers some limitations embedded in such 
discussions regarding the relationship between the fields and suggests directions for future studies to address these 
limitations. 
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Introduction 
Moral philosophers and psychologists have proposed diverse perspectives to deal with the debates regarding the 
definition of morality. First, we may consider outcome-oriented or rule-based moral philosophical viewpoints 
1 This is the postprint of the accepted manuscript, which was finally accepted by editors. The final version of this 
manuscript is available through the publisher’s webpage (Springer). 
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(Barnett et al. 2005). Basically, these standpoints are mainly interested behavioural outcomes (consequentialism) or 
moral rules (deontology) instead of an actor’s disposition or character while making moral judgment (Sinnott-
Armstrong 2011; Alexander and Moore 2012). Consequently, moral psychological models based on this 
philosophical vantage point, such as the Kohlbergian model, which employs ideas of Kantian, Rawlsian and 
utilitarian moral philosophy (Kohlberg 1981; Blum 1988) to establish its philosophical framework, tend to 
emphasize the role of moral cognition and moral reasoning that are essential in evaluating norms, rules and 
predicted behavioural outcomes in moral judgment. According to this viewpoint, moral behaviour or motivation is 
defined as a behaviour or motivation originated from the obedience to moral principle (in case of deontology) or that 
maximizes goods (in case of consequentialism) (Nunner-Winkler 1997; De Colle and Werhane 2008). On the other 
hand, the proponents of virtue ethics have proposed significant counterarguments against the outcome-oriented or 
rule-based viewpoints (Hursthouse 2012). Unlike previously mentioned viewpoints, those proponents argue that 
happiness or flourishing (eudaimonia) of a person is most fundamental in morality (Snow 2008; Kraut 2014). They 
contend that moral virtue, which becomes the basis of morality, can be regarded as a long-term, habituated and 
internalized disposition that eventually leads us to eudaimonia with the guidance of practical wisdom (phronesis) 
(Curzer 2012; Silverstein and Trombetti 2013; Kristjánsson 2014). Phronesis, or practical wisdom, is defined as 
reasoning enabling us to make an appropriate decision in a certain situation, which leads us to the middle way 
(Sanderse 2012).  A developmental and psychological model based on this philosophical vantage point argues that 
the process of early habituation and later cultivation of phronesis are fundamentally required (Kristjánsson 2007a; 
Carr 2008; Han 2015); it particularly underscores the development of integrative moral character (Arthur 2003; 
Hartman 2006) enabling us to make an appropriate moral decision and to adjust our emotional and motivational 
forces at an appropriate level guided by phronesis (Kristjánsson 2000; Molewijk et al. 2011), rather than the 
development of a specific moral function, such as moral reasoning in the case of Kohlbergian theory. 
Based on these aspects of virtue ethics and virtue ethical moral psychology and education, the present study will 
delve into the relationship between virtue ethics and neuroscience. First, the present essay, which is interested in 
moral education as well as moral philosophy, surmises that the theoretical framework of virtue moral philosophy 
seems to be more coherent with the recent integrative moral educational approach that aims to foster students’ moral 
character, which embraces all aspects of human morality—i.e., moral reasoning, moral affection and moral 
behaviour (Lickona 1996; Berkowitz 2002; Blasi 2005; Narvaez and Lapsley 2005; Althof and Berkowitz 2006)—
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comparing to other moral philosophical viewpoints. Moral psychological models originating from outcome-oriented 
or rule-based moral philosophy tend to focus on the development of certain aspects of moral functioning, 
particularly moral reasoning in the case of Kohlbergian moral psychology (Kohlberg 1981; Kohlberg 1984), so they 
are not likely to be suitable for directly applying to moral education aiming at developing holistic moral character. 
Instead, a more inclusive theoretical framework, virtue ethics, equally underscores the role of moral habit, 
disposition and phronesis (Kristjánsson 2013; Kraut 2014). Second, its developmental model (Sanderse 2014) would 
provide more useful insights to scholars and educators. Finally, the naturalistic aspect of Aristotelian virtue ethics 
would make it be better supported by scientific evidence comparing to other moral philosophical perspectives 
(Kristjánsson 2007a; Jeong and Han 2013; Jacobs 2014). Therefore, the present essay will concentrate on virtue 
ethics and its psychological and educational models among diverse theoretical frameworks while exploring the 
connection between recent neuroscience and studies of human morality.  
Neuroscientists have sought the neural substrate of human morality, which establishes biological basis of moral 
behaviour, using various methods, such as functional and structural neuroimaging and non-invasive brain 
stimulation methods (Poldrack 2008; Young et al. 2010; Tassy et al. 2012; Jeurissen et al. 2014). They have 
demonstrated how activity in brain regions associated with affection, cognition, motivation and other moral 
psychological processes are related to moral functioning. These neuroscientific studies of human morality have 
significantly and pervasively influenced other traditional disciplines dealing with morality including, but not limited 
to, moral philosophy, moral psychology and moral education (Narvaez and Vaydich 2008; Han 2014). For instance, 
previous neuroimaging studies investigating the involvement of affective processes in moral cognition proposed a 
novel idea about moral psychological mechanisms of deontological and utilitarian moral decision-making, which 
provided a new vantage point to moral philosophy (Greene et al. 2001; Greene et al. 2004; Greene 2007).  
The present essay will start with discussing how the recent neuroscience can support moral philosophical and 
psychological accounts of human morality proposed by virtue theorists by reviewing empirical evidence. In the first 
section, the present essay will focus on whether the moral philosophical basis of Aristotelian virtue ethics is 
coherent with neuroscientific evidence and how well the evidence can explain its psychological and developmental 
models. Furthermore, the second section will consider the future directions of neuroimaging studies focusing on 
moral virtue and character. More specifically, this essay will concentrate on how neuroimaging methods can 
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contribute to the scientific investigation of virtue, character development, and finally, the development of 
educational methods based on this viewpoint.    
Exploring the Relationship between Aristotelian Virtue Theory and Neuroscience 
This section consists of two sub-sections dealing with the core philosophical basis (first part) and developmental 
processes (second part) proposed by Aristotelian ethics. First, I discuss whether the core philosophical element of 
Aristotelian moral philosophy, that is, motivational externalism (Kristjánsson 2012), which argues the necessity of 
emotional and motivational elements, which are independent from moral reasoning for moral action (Zagzebski 
1996), can be supported by neuroscientific evidence. Second, I discuss whether findings in developmental 
neuroscience correspond to the model of amoral developmental theory proposed by Aristotelian ethics, which 
especially underscores the habituation of virtue as well as the cultivation phronesis (Hursthouse 2012; Kristjánsson 
2014). 
Motivational Externalism and Social Neuroscience 
There have been continuous controversies regarding the relationship between moral reasoning and moral behaviour. 
More specifically, scholars have debated whether moral decision based on moral reasoning does necessarily result in 
actual behaviour. There are two distinctive points of view explaining the relationship: motivational internalism and 
motivational externalism. The proponents of motivational internalism, motivational internalists, argue that moral 
judgment itself generates motivation for behaviour (Rosati 2006). On the other hand, motivational externalists 
proposing motivational externalism contend that moral judgment does not necessarily generate moral behavioural 
outcome; instead, they argue that other motivational factors, such as a strong will, are required to bridge the gap 
between judgment and behaviour (Rosati 2006).  
In this section, the present essay will discuss why motivational externalism seems to be more convincing and better 
explain the reality compared to motivational internalism based on empirical evidence in the fields of psychology and 
neuroscience. Of course, motivational internalism perhaps is perhaps better than motivational externalism in terms 
of its structure. Motivational internalism explains the mechanism of moral behaviour with a relatively simple and 
straightforward model (Mele 1989; Shafer-Landau 2000; Bjorklund et al. 2012); it does not require the complicated 
involvement of diverse psychological constructs or components, such as a will, to explain how motivation is 
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generated. Also, as shown by the Kohlbergian model of moral reasoning development (Kohlberg 1981; Kohlberg 
1984), the internalism model was perhaps supported by empirical evidence. However, since the foundation of 
internalism is being threatened by the recent findings from psychological and neuroscientific studies, the present 
essay will discuss why externalism is a more plausible framework explaining the mechanism of moral behaviour.  
Social neuroscience suggests that motivation for moral behaviour does not originate directly from the result of moral 
judgment, as argued by motivational internalists. Instead, it implies that other psychological processes, particularly 
affective and rewarding processes, are inevitably involved in the formation of moral motivation and action, as 
proposed by motivational externalists. Motivational internalism argues, “a person cannot sincerely make a moral 
judgment without being motivated at least to some degree to abide by her judgment” (Rosati 2006). Although there 
are two types of internalism, strong and weak, both acknowledge that moral judgment is necessary in moral 
motivation and action (Rosati 2006). Several neuroscientific experiments are not consistent with those standpoints. 
First, brain lesion studies focusing on human morality significantly threaten the validity of strong internalism. The 
case study of Phineas Gage demonstrated that the lesion in the prefrontal cortex caused significant deficiency in 
socio-moral adjustment (Barker 1995). Although his intellectual ability to make judgments was intact for a while, 
his socio-moral character and behavioural tendency were severely regressed immediately after the accident 
(Kihlstrom 2010). Moreover, a recent experiment investigated more directly the association between the lesion in 
the medial prefrontal cortex, which deals with affection, and the integration of motivational force (Tranel 2002), 
moral reasoning, and moral motivation (Saver and Damasio 1991). This experiment demonstrated that, for patients 
whose medial prefrontal cortex was damaged during their adulthood, although their average moral judgment score 
was not significantly worse than that of normal participants, they showed severe socio-moral maladjustment, 
embodied by a morally inappropriate behavioural tendency. Given these experiments, strong motivational 
internalism can be refuted, because although those presented patients were able to make sound moral judgments and 
their moral reasoning was intact, their moral motivation and behavioural tendency were significantly deficient. Thus, 
moral judgment cannot be a sufficient condition for moral motivation and behaviour. 
Second, the validity of weak internalism can also be criticized by neuroscientific evidence. Although weak 
internalism endorses that mental illness or another motivational force can override the result of sound moral 
judgment, it still maintains the position that sound moral judgment is at least a necessary condition for moral 
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motivation and behaviour (Brink 1997). Thus, counterexamples, demonstrating that moral motivation and behaviour 
can be generated without moral judgment, can threaten this version of internalism. In fact, behavioural and 
developmental neurosciences focusing on moral motivation and behaviour in infancy show us the possibility of 
moral motivation and behaviour without sophisticated formal moral judgment (Decety and Howard 2013). For 
instance, even very young infants, such as 3-months-olds (Hamlin et al. 2010) or 6-months-olds (Hamlin et al. 
2007), are motivated to prefer prosocial and moral behaviour over antisocial and anti-moral behaviour, although 
they are not capable of making sound and sophisticated moral judgments (Piaget 1948; Kohlberg 1984). Scholars 
suggest that this phenomenon occurs due to the presence of hard-wired morality in infants’ brains (Bloom 2012). 
Because Aristotelian virtue ethics acknowledges that children can have rudimentary forms of moral virtues, although 
those virtues are not full virtues moderated by phronesis (Kraut 2014), the results of these scientific experiments 
may indicate that moral motivation and behaviour, at least in their rudimentary forms, can exist even among infants. 
Hence, those counterexamples can threaten the validity of weak motivational internalism, and support the core of 
Aristotelian ethics, that is, motivational externalism. 
However, some may contend that we should consider other components on top of explicit behavioural outcome itself 
while we are evaluating the moral aspect of behaviour. For instance, although Phineas Gage’s behaviour was 
socially inappropriate and can be considered to be anti-moral, his behaviour may not be completely anti-moral 
because he may not possess a mental ability to take moral responsibility due to the brain injury; if he lacked such a 
mental ability, we cannot blame him for behaving anti-morally (Fischer and Ravizza 2000). Moreover, children’s 
prosocial behavioural tendency presented in psychological studies may also not be regarded as moral behavioural 
tendency. Since moral philosophers have argued that we should evaluate the moral aspect of certain behaviour based 
on not only its behavioural outcome itself but also its intention (Anscome 1958; Pellegrino 1995), it would be 
inappropriate to say that children’s prosocial behaviour initially generated by instinct is moral. Thus, we should 
consider these factors, i.e., responsibility and intention, while evaluating certain behaviour. 
Then, how the components of responsibility and intention in moral behaviour is related to the prior discussion of the 
validity of motivational externalism? The present study intends to review previous psychological studies examining 
the psychological mechanism and neural correlates of moral responsibility and intention. Previous social 
psychological works have shown that people may withdraw themselves from moral behaviour even when they made 
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a sound moral judgment due to moral disengagement originating from the lack of the sense of responsibility 
(Bandura 1990; Bandura 1999). Also, previous neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that a brain circuitry 
associated with self-agency and possibility the sense of responsibility was significantly activated in moral decision-
making task conditions (Moll et al. 2007), and it significantly interacted with brain regions associated with moral 
judgment (Han et al. 2016). Furthermore, a recent experiment demonstrated that the factor of intention influenced 
behavioural outcome on top of decision-making processes (Greene et al. 2009); a neuroimaging study also found the 
neural correlates of intention judgment by setting the type of intention as an independent variable (Borg et al. 2006). 
Given these previous studies, the present essay shall conclude that the psychological and neural mechanism of 
responsibility and intention are perhaps independent from those of moral reasoning itself in the generation of 
behavioural motivation, and they would empirically support motivational externalism, not motivational internalism. 
Development of moral virtue and developmental neuroscience 
Findings in developmental neuroscience also support the developmental model of Aristotelian ethicists. Both early 
habituation and internalization of moral virtue, as well as cultivation of phronesis, which moderates motivational 
forces to be appropriately exerted in a given situation, are necessary for the achievement of the ultimate purpose of 
human life, that is, eudaimonia (Aristotle 2000; Wall 2003; Kristjánsson 2014), according to Aristotelian 
perspective.  
First, the previous lesion study demonstrated that the average moral judgment interview score among patients with 
early-onset prefrontal damage was significantly worse than that of normal participants. This study proposed that 
patients with such damage were not able to internalize moral norms into their brain reward system, hindering their 
further development of moral reasoning, given the somatic marker hypothesis (Saver and Damasio 1991; Damasio 
1994). It can support the standpoint of Aristotelian moral development, which emphasizes the importance of early 
habituation of moral norms for the acquisition of moral virtue and eudaimonia. Of course, a continent person, who 
has developed moral reasoning without early-habituation of moral virtue, can behave morally because she knows 
well what is morally appropriate (Kristjánsson 2013; Fowers 2014); however, because moral norm and affection are 
not completely integrated into her selfhood, they become a sort of external imperative for her, not a natural trait, and 
can hardly serve for her moral flourishing and happiness (Stocker 2003). Thus, the neuroscientific investigation 
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corresponds to this Aristotelian account on moral development, which emphasizes the importance of early 
internalization of moral virtue for the future development of moral character, including moral reasoning. 
Second, developmental brain studies have shown that the Aristotelian version of the moral developmental course, 
which consists of the habituation of norms and cultivation of wisdom, may occur in the physical reality. According 
to this idea, the early habituation and internalization of moral norms through repetitive behavioural training, 
followed by the cultivation of phronesis, are required for the development of moral character (Carr 2008; 
Kristjánsson 2014). Some neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that one of the most salient aspects of moral 
development at the neural level during early-childhood through early-adolescence is that brain regions associated 
with the motivational and reward system (e.g., amygdala, nucleus accumbens, orbitofrontal cortex, ventral striatum), 
which engages in the habituation and internalization of rules (Wilson and Rolls 2005; Blair 2007), develop earlier 
than regions associated with sophisticated reasoning (Galvan et al. 2006; Hare et al. 2008; Decety et al. 2012). This 
aspect would also be supported by neuroimaging studies demonstrating that habituation actually influences the 
neural mechanism of affection and motivation (Tricomi et al. 2009; Lingawi and Balleine 2012; de Wit et al. 2012). 
Then, in regions correlated with reasoning based on prudence, self-control, and sophisticated self-reflective 
processes (e.g., lateral prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex) (Moll et al. 2007; Buckner et al. 2008; 
Immordino-Yang et al. 2012), that correspond to the concept of phronesis in Aristotelian philosophy, the activity 
becomes salient beyond adolescence (Casey et al. 2008; Wright et al. 2008; Harenski et al. 2012). This neural-level 
developmental trend suggests that the moral developmental course proposed by Aristotelian ethics may actually 
occur in the human brain. 
Although there have been no neuroscientific studies that directly focused on the neural-level effect of moral 
educational interventions, some experiments can shed light on this issue. First, training programs designed for the 
habituation of certain actions, such as juggling, induced myelination in regions associated with the function (Scholz 
et al. 2009). Second, even for the cultivation of reasoning, which is more sophisticated than the case of habituation, 
interventions, such as board games (B. Lee et al. 2010), reasoning exercises (Mackey et al. 2012), working memory 
training (Olesen et al. 2004; Takeuchi et al. 2010), and meditation programs (Lazar et al. 2005), promoted 
significant structural changes in brain regions associated with cognition and reasoning. These results would support 
the idea that Aristotelian ways for moral education—i.e., habituation and phronesis cultivation—actually influences 
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the brain structure according to the idea of neuroplasticity (LeDoux 2002) and previous neuroscientific studies 
demonstrating the neural-level effect of habituation and learning (Tricomi et al. 2009; Lingawi and Balleine 2012; 
de Wit et al. 2012). 
Utilizing Neuroscientific Methods to Investigate Moral Development 
Moral virtue has been an important issue in the fields of moral psychology and education. Moral psychologists and 
educators who aim to develop students’ character as a whole tend to pay their attention to the concept of integrative 
moral virtue rather than individual moral function, such as moral cognition or affection (C. Lee and Taylor 2013). 
To accurately diagnose the current developmental status and evaluate the effects of educational endeavours, scholars 
need a well-developed measurement of moral virtue. Then what are possible ways to measure the development of 
moral virtue? It seems to be difficult to properly measure this conceptual construct because we, human, cannot have 
a perfect insight into a subjects’ mind with scientific methods; we can only have proxies to the mind, instead of 
“mind reading strategies,” to conduct a scientific investigation of moral virtue. Aristotle gave us a hint about one 
possible proxy of moral virtue. 
If a man once acquires reason, that makes a difference in action; and his state, while still like what it was, will then 
be virtue in the strict sense. (Aristotle 2000) 
Behavioural observation would be a possible way to assess whether a person possesses a certain moral virtue in 
his/her self, given the quote of Aristotle. In fact, this method has been frequently utilized by developmental 
psychologists, particularly who are interested in early childhood development (Woodhead and Paulkner 2000). 
However, there are significant limitations in this method. First, a mere presence of moral behaviour cannot prove 
that the actor of the behaviour possesses moral virtue. According to Aristotle’s account on the habituation of moral 
virtue and moral character, the repetition and consistency of the moral behaviour are more important than a mere 
presence of the behaviour (Aristotle 2000). Thus, the observation of moral behaviour in an empirical study, which is 
usually conducted during a short period, does not necessarily confirm that a participant has completely integrated 
moral virtue into his/her self. In addition, we should be aware of the possibility of social and desirability biases. 
Participants do not behave as they actually behave in their everyday lives because they want to show that they 
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behave in a moral and socially desirable manner to observers (Adair 1984). Because of these reasons, thus, the 
reliability and credibility of behavioural observation to measure moral virtue would be severely threatened. 
These limitations are also common to the questionnaire method, which is usually being utilized by moral 
psychologists and educators (Kristjánsson 2013). The desirability bias is also an important issue in this case. For 
instance, if we ask our participants to rate the importance of keywords, which include both moral and non-moral 
ones, to them, they would naturally tend to rate moral keywords are important to them regardless of whether the 
moral values and virtues embedded in the keywords are really important to them, and integrated into their selfhood 
because they want to show that they are moral people. In addition, validity would not also be guaranteed; in other 
words, we are not sure about whether we can measure moral virtue, which is inevitably internal and covert, with a 
paper-and-pencil questionnaire.  
Therefore, moral philosophers and psychologists need a more direct approach to internal psychological processes 
that enables them to properly measure the development of moral virtue. Neuroimaging methods, which have been 
rapidly developed during last couple of decades, would address the problems of previous methods. The 
neuroimaging methods present significant advantages over current methods for assessing moral development such as 
self-reporting, which (1) do not give scientists insight into the substructures that process moral virtue and that 
underlie manifest behaviour; and which (2) are biased by respondents’ subjectivity (Ito and Cacioppo 2007).  
Neuroimaging Methods to Measure Moral Virtue 
The neuroscientific investigations of moral virtue can start by examining moral exemplars who are realizing moral 
virtue in their lives. Colby and Damon (1992) emphasized that empirical studies of moral exemplars can provide us 
with useful insights regarding the nature of human morality, which could not be completely examined by traditional 
moral psychological studies targeted at ordinary people. Because the moral exemplars are a paragon of moral virtue, 
it would be informative to investigate their developmental and psychological characteristics. In fact, this “reverse-
engineering method” shows us how moral virtue works in reality through the real exemplars (Walker 2013). Thus, 
comparing brains between moral exemplars that have already acquired moral virtue and ordinary people is a good 
starting point of our endeavours to measure the internal mechanism of moral virtue.  
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Functional neuroimaging. Given the theoretical framework of virtue ethics and character psychology, the integration 
of moral virtue into a person’s selfhood is an important goal in character development (Kristjánsson 2007b). Thus, it 
is reasonable to research the link between moral virtue to an individual’s sense of “self” to examine the development 
of moral virtue. At the neural level, this research can be conducted by measuring the connectivity between brain 
regions associated with moral virtue and self-related processes, such as self-reflection and self-referencing (Buckner 
et al. 2008).  
The neuroimaging studies of the default mode network (DMN), which is closely associated with psychological 
processes regarding the selfhood, self-referential and autobiographic processes (Immordino-Yang et al. 2012) are 
particularly informative for our research on the mechanisms of selfhood and self-related psychological processes at 
the neural level. In these DMN studies, scientists have reported that certain brain regions were deactivated while 
participants were consciously involved in cognitive tasks. On the contrary, these regions were activated when the 
participants were in resting state. This pattern significantly differed from the pattern usually reported in previous 
neuroimaging studies. The regions included the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), 
precuneus, and inferior parietal lobule (IPL). The scientists named the network of these regions, which has only 
been activated during resting state, as the DMN; and they hypothesized that this network would be related to 
introspective self-related psychological processes, instead of goal-driven cognitive functions (Buckner et al. 2008). 
As the scientists hypothesized, an interesting aspect of the DMN is that this network is extensively activated when 
participants are requested to do a sort of self-related tasks. For instance, the DMN was significantly more activated 
during the self-adjective association ask condition than other-adjective task association condition (Zhu et al. 2007). 
In addition, when a part of this network, the precuneus, was disrupted by the transcraniel magnetic stimulation 
(TMS), the efficiency of the self-adjective association task declined and became identical to that of the other-
adjective association task (Lou et al. 2010). Thus, given these findings, the DMN is the neural network extensively 
associated with the selfhood and its related psychological processes. 
In fact, recent neuroimaging studies that examined the neural substrate of admiration showed that the PCC and 
precuneus in the DMN were particularly activated under the moral virtue admiration condition compared with the 
physical excellence admiration condition (Immordino-Yang et al. 2009; Englander et al. 2012). In addition, previous 
functional neuroimaging studies have consistently demonstrated that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) 
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and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), which constitute the DMN, were significantly associated with prosocial and moral 
emotion and moral cognition (Moll et al. 2007; Moll and de Oliveira-Souza 2007; Reniers et al. 2012; Han et al. 
2014; Sevinc and Spreng 2014; Han et al. 2016). Given these findings, the DMN is the core of moral self, and the 
region of interest in virtue ethics and character psychology. We will be able to quantify the degree of the 
development of moral virtue at the neural level, and to approach the inner psychological processes of virtue and 
character, which has not been completely investigated, by investigating the strength and robustness of the functional 
connectivity between these DMN regions and other regions associated with individual moral functions, such as 
moral compassion and moral indignation.  
We can examine the strength of the neural connectivity between brain regions associated with self-related processes 
and moral functions. The neural connectivity is calculated from the series of functional brain images that are 
acquired while participants are watching visual stimuli that induce moral emotional responses closely associated 
with moral virtue, or solving moral dilemmas. In addition to the brain connectivity under the task conditions, the 
connectivity measured during resting state is also informative as shown in previous DMN studies (e.g., Buckner et 
al., 2008). Finally, because it is usually expected that moral exemplars are successfully integrate moral virtue into 
their selfhood, their functional connectivity between brain regions dealing with moral and self-related functions 
would significantly differ from that among ordinary people. This approach can also contribute to the development of 
a more effective moral educational program by evaluating the effectiveness of the newly invented program. The 
quality of the program can be evaluated by measuring whether the program induces significant change in the 
functional connectivity specified by the functional neuroimaging project comparing ordinary people and moral 
exemplars. 
Structural neuroimaging. Structural neuroimaging studies have shown that various trainings including both physical 
and cognitive skill trainings induced significant changes in brains at the structural level (e.g., Scholz, Klein, 
Behrens, & Johansen-Berg, 2009; Takeuchi et al., 2010). For instance, long-term trained players of the game of 
“Baduk (Go),” an Asian board game, showed a significantly different brain anatomy in the frontal, cinglulum, and 
striato-thalamic areas dealing with attentional control, working memory, executive regulation, and problem-solving, 
compared with non-experts (B. Lee et al. 2010). Thus, given this fact, we can expect that moral exemplars that have 
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successfully habituated and internalized moral virtue would show significantly different structural characteristics in 
brain regions associated with moral and self-related functions compared with ordinary people.  
Therefore, we can utilize the grey matter thickness measurement. It measures the thickness of grey matters in the 
region of interest using high-resolution structural brain images, and enables researchers to investigate developmental 
or pathological changes from the quantified thickness (Fischl and Dale 2000). For instance, O’Donnell, Noseworthy, 
Levine, and Denis (2005)  examined the developmental changes in the frontopolar area, which is associated with 
cognitive function, from childhood to adolescence using this method. Given the findings of previous studies using 
this method, the structural characteristics of grey matters were continuously affected by both internal (e.g., aging), 
and external (e.g., environment and training) factors (Lazar et al. 2005; O’Donnell et al. 2005). In addition, the 
diffusion-tensor imaging (DTI) can also be used to examine changes in brain regions. This method quantifies 
diffusion anisotropy effects in white matters, and investigates the microstructure of the human brain (Assaf and 
Pasternak 2008). The DTI method has also been applied to investigate the influences of both internal and external 
factors on the brain structure (e.g., Lee et al., 2010; Molinuevo et al., 2012; Scholz et al., 2009; Takeuchi et al., 
2010).  
Particularly, the structural changes in brain regions associated with moral function and the DMN to examine 
character development at the level of brain structure are important. In addition, researchers will be able to discover 
other brain regions that would be related to moral virtue, which have not been yet reported by previous studies, 
through the comparison in the brain anatomy between exemplars and ordinary people. In fact, structural changes 
were usually observed in a brain region that is directly associated with a function of interest in the previous studies 
of the brain structure (e.g., Lazar et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2010), so brain regions associated with moral virtue would 
show significantly different brain structures between moral exemplars and ordinary people. Again, we can expect 
that the habituation and internalization of moral virtue, which are the most important characteristics of moral 
exemplars, would be reflected in the structural feature of the regions. Furthermore, we will be able to apply the 
structural neuroimaging methods to evaluate the longitudinal effect of a newly invented moral educational program. 
The educational effect at the neural level can be measured by focusing on the degree of the structural change in 
regions selected by the exemplar-based experiment that is potentially induced by the program. 
Limitations and future directions 
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However, we have to be aware of several limitations of the methods. First, we have to take into account that the 
majority of previous neuroimaging studies examining human morality have utilized hypothetical moral dilemmas 
instead of real problems (Christensen and Gomila 2012). If we do not seriously consider how to employ realistic 
dilemmas that can be implemented in neuroimaging settings, we cannot properly investigate the neural correlates of 
moral virtue and character because the development of moral virtue and character can only be completely evaluated 
if we investigate all of moral reasoning, moral affection, moral motivation, and moral behaviour (Curren and Kotzee 
2014; Fowers 2014). Particularly, the core concept of virtue ethics, phronesis, cannot be properly understood by 
considering only cognitive aspect of human morality; the exercise of phronesis is inevitably associated with 
emotion, motivation and behaviour on top of moral reasoning (Stovall 2011; Hursthouse 2012; Kristjánsson 2014). 
Thus, we should develop a measurement of moral virtue and character that employs realistic situations inducing 
activation of all aspects of human moral functioning on top of moral reasoning, which has been mainly examined by 
previous neuroimaging studies using hypothetical dilemmas. Unfortunately, due to the restricted circumstance in 
MR scanners, the potential measurement would be inevitably text- and/or picture-based similar to previous moral 
dilemma tasks. Thus, recently developed text-based measurements based on virtue ethics, such as a prototype of 
gratitude measurement (Morgan et al. 2014), measurement for virtuous law practice (Arthur et al. 2014) and 
measurement for virtuous medical practice (Arthur et al. 2015), would be most promising candidates that can be 
utilized in neuroimaging studies. These measurements can also be applied to measure the longitudinal effect of a 
newly developed virtue ethics-based moral educational program at the neural level. 
Second, because neuroscientific studies of human morality have employed diverse experimental paradigms and 
tasks, they would not produce totally comparable and coherent results; it would significantly hinder the 
interpretation of the results. In fact, there have been concerns regarding the possibility of statistical idiosyncrasies 
that would be produced by the differences in methods while interpreting a set of results of multiple neuroimaging 
experiments (Wager et al. 2004). Thus, we should carefully consider how to address the possible idiosyncrasies, 
which would be problematic during the interpretation of multiple individual neuroimaging experiments, and how to 
properly find out the psychological and educational implications from them. One possible way is to utilize a meta-
analysis of multiple neuroimaging studies; for instance, the Activation Estimated Likelihood (ALE) method 
implemented in GingerALE (Laird et al. 2005; Eickhoff et al. 2009) is a feasible meta-analysis method easily 
applied to analysis of neuroimaging studies in socio-moral neuroscience (Bzdok et al. 2012; Sevinc and Spreng 
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2014). Although the experiments included in the meta-analysis model would not be completely comparable or 
coherent with each other, the process of the meta-analysis is effective to reduce the statistical idiosyncrasies possibly 
embedded in individual experiments and to produce statistically reliable and valid outcomes (e.g., common 
activation foci, common neural correlates of a function of interest) (Wager et al. 2004; Etkin and Wager 2007; 
Costafreda 2009). Of course, the meta-analysis is also the most feasible method to increase the statistical power, 
which is likely to be week in each individual neuroimaging study due to its small sample size (Cacioppo et al. 2013). 
Scholars who are interested in neuroimaging studies of moral virtue and character can utilize this analysis method 
once multiple neuroimaging experiments, which might seem to be primarily incomparable, are conducted. They will 
be able to get statistically reliable, valid and powerful results by meta-analysing multiple experiments, and finally, to 
approach the neural-level mechanism of moral virtue and character. This kind of meta-analysis can also be applied 
to compare the effect of diverse moral educational approaches once neuroimaging studies examining the 
longitudinal effect of educational methods are performed and the findings are accumulated in a database. 
Concluding Remarks 
The present essay reviewed the relationship between virtue ethics and contemporary neuroscience and how methods 
in neuroscience can contribute to the studies in moral philosophy, moral psychology, and moral education. First, the 
present essay discussed how and why virtue ethics and its psychological model are more coherent with 
contemporary neuroscience than are other ethical theories by considering the philosophical account of moral 
motivation and developmental model. Second, we sought how to apply neuroscientific methods, particularly 
functional and structural neuroimaging methods, to studies in moral philosophy, psychology and education based on 
virtue ethics while discussing their limitations and how to deal with the limitations. Given these discussions, the 
present essay concludes that virtue ethics and its psychological and educational models will be able to be well 
supported by experiments on the neural mechanism of morality and neuroscientific methods.  
Of course, although scientific findings seem to support Aristotelian moral philosophy and psychology, we must not 
attempt merely to reduce the philosophical and developmental theories into activity of biological substances, or 
incautiously equate philosophy, psychology, and natural sciences. Then, what would be appropriate ways to address 
this issue? First, Aristotelian moral philosophy can provide ideas to establish hypotheses for neuroscientific 
investigations on morality, while neurosciences can support empirically the philosophical and developmental 
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assumptions of Aristotelian ethics (Han 2014). Second, moral philosophically justified and psychologically effective 
moral educational interventions can be developed through the cooperation between Aristotelian moral philosophy, 
moral psychology, and neurosciences (e.g., neuroimaging experiments examining the effects of virtue ethics-based 
moral education) (Jeong and Han 2013; Han 2014). Through these methods, moral philosophy, psychology and 
education based on Aristotelian ethics and neurosciences dealing with morality will be able to benefit each other 
synergistically. 
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